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Empirical evidence suggests that prices are sticky: rms do not immediately adjust to
changes in costs. For example, in a survey of 200 rms, Blinder et al. (1998) found that
the median rm adjusts prices about once a year. Hall, Walsh, and Yates (2000) obtained
similar results in a survey of 654 British companies. In a study of newsstand prices of 38
American magazines over 1953{79, Cecchetti (1986) determined that the number of years
since the last price change ranged from 1.8 to 14 years. Kashyap (1995), in a study of
the monthly prices of mail-order catalog goods, found an average of 14.7 months between
price changes. MacDonald and Aaronson (2001) determined that restaurant prices display
a median duration of about 10 months. In a broad sample of consumer goods, Klenow and
Kryvtsov (2008) found that the median consumer good changes prices every 4.3 months.
The purpose of this paper is to develop a search theoretic model of sticky consumer
prices. We consider an industry where input costs are sticky and show that consumer
search costs lead to output prices that are stickier than input costs. To understand the
mechanism for this \increasing stickiness" pattern, suppose that consumer prices are cur-
rently in equilibrium (specically, in a Diamond-type equilibrium). The idea is that, if rm
i's cost changes by a small amount, then rm i is better o by not changing its price. In fact,
if price remains constant then consumers rationally believe there have been no cost shocks,
and consequently refrain from searching: it's business as usual. By contrast, changing price
\rocks the boat," that is, leads consumers to search; and the potential loss from consumers
searching rivals' prices outweighs the potential gain from adjusting price to its new optimal
level.
While our analysis is motivated by evidence of price stickiness, we are also interested in
the stylized fact that prices adjust (upward) more quickly to cost increases than (downward)
to cost decreases (see Peltzman, 2000, and references therein). Our model accounts for such
asymmetric behavior in a natural way. The idea is that a small price increase (decrease)
signals a positive (negative) cost shock. As a result, the potential gains from search are
greater following a small price decrease than a small price increase. This implies that the
above eect (\business as usual" beats \rocking the boat") is especially relevant following
a small cost decrease.
A common explanation for price stickiness is that there is a xed physical cost that rms
must pay whenever they change a price | a menu cost (e.g, Sheshinski and Weiss, 1977,
Levy, Bergen, Dutta, and Venable, 1997)). This approach is often criticized on the grounds
that for most products it is hard to identify signicant xed physical costs of changing
prices. Several other papers develop models in which consumer frictions lead to incomplete
price adjustment. Stiglitz (1987) shows that a model with convex search costs can be
consistent with real and nominal rigidities. Klemperer (1995), Klesshchelski and Vincent
(2007) and Menzio (2006) show that rigidities may arise if it is costly for consumers to
switch sellers. Nakamura and Steinsson (2005) show that prices might not fully adjust to
cost increases when consumers form habits in individual goods which lock them in with
specic sellers. Rotemberg (2005) develops a model in which rms may fail to increase
prices in order not to antagonize customers, a hypothesis which is supported empirically by
Anderson and Simester (2010). Mankiw and Reis (2002) and Reis (2006) develop models
in which it is costly for rms to absorb, process and interpret information about costs and
consequently only adjust prices at certain dates. Lewis (2005), Tappata (2009) and Yang
1and Ye (2008) develop search theoretic models to explain asymmetric price adjustment.
Most closely related to our model are Benabou and Gertner (1993) and Fishman (1995),
who use a similar framework to analyze equilibrium pricing when rms costs are determined
as the product of a common inationary factor and a privately observed idiosyncratic shock.
Although our paper shares various features with the above literature, we make a dis-
tinctive contribution: we show that search costs imply a magnication in the degree of price
stickiness, that is, equilibrium output prices are stickier than input prices.
We then consider an extension of our model to allow for the possibility that the oc-
currence and the direction of cost changes are correlated across rms. In addition to price
stickiness, this version of the model also implies asymmetric price adjustment: a small cost
increase leads to a small price increase, for consumers expect the other rm's cost (and
price) also to have increased, and thus refrain from searching; a small cost decrease, how-
ever, leads to no price change, for the same reason as before, that is, because the rm fears
inducing consumer search.
The paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, we lay down the basic model structure.
In Section 3, we present our main result regarding sticky prices. Section 4 considers an
extension of the model which leads to a a pattern of asymmetric adjustment of prices to
costs. We conclude with Section 5.
2. Model
We consider a model with a continuum of rms (of mass two) and a continuum of consumers
(of mass two as well). The rms are divided into two groups of equal size, A and B. Firm
costs are identical within each group. For simplicity, we will refer to two rms, A and B,
although there is a mass one of each type of rm.
Time is innite and discrete: t = 1;2;::: In each period, each consumer is randomly
assigned to a rm, leaving each rm with an assigned consumer. Together with the as-
sumption that there is a continuum of rms, this implies that each rm maximizes prots
considering exclusively its current consumer's actions. In other words, each rm's future
value function does not depend on current actions.
Each rm sets its price p and each consumer demands a quantity q(p) = a p from the
seller with the lowest price observed by that consumer. Specically, while a consumer is
assigned to a given rm, he has the option to search for another rm's price by paying a
cost s > 0.1 We have in mind a product which is consumed repeatedly and for which the
quantity demanded is sensitive to price. Examples include cable, cell phone, and restaurant
services, when the buyer is the nal consumer;2 and production inputs (such as our), when
the buyer is a rm (such as a bakery).
Let (p) be the consumer's surplus from buying at price p and (p;c) the rm's prot
given price p, constant unit cost c, and a mass one of consumers. Noting that (p;c) is
concave, denote by pm(c) the unique monopoly price for a rm with cost c.
1. We assume that consumers can distinguish between a type A and a type B rm.
2. The demand for cable and cell phone services is downward sloping to the extent that following a price
increase consumers switch to a lower q tier or plan, respectively. The demand for restaurant meals
is downward sloping to the extent that, as prices increase, consumers dine out less frequently or skip
desert, wine, more expensive dishes, etc.
The model could also accommodate the case of unit demand by introducing heterogenous consumers
with dierent reservation prices. This would lead to a more complicated model.
2Firm i's unit cost at time t, cit, evolves according to a Markov process where the state
is given by both rms' costs. The Markov transition function is common knowledge, but
not the cost levels. At each period t, rm i is informed about its own cost.
Consumers, by contrast, have limited information regarding rms. In each period, they
observe the price set by the rm they are assigned to. Moreover, they observe the market's
cost and price distribution at odd periods (i.e., at t = 1;3;5, and so on). However, any
changes in other rms' prices (or in the cost or price distribution) which occur at even
periods (i.e., at t = 2;4, and so on) are not observed.3 Similarly, Firm A (resp. B) observes
the cost of Firm B (resp. A) at odd periods but does not observe any changes in the other
rms' cost which occur at even periods.
The idea of the above model assumption is that it is too costly for agents to continually
update and interpret information about the economy, so agents are \inattentive" to new
information most of the time and only update information at pre-specied intervals. The
assumption that this updating is coordinated between consumers is clearly articial and is
made for tractability | in a richer model the frequency of information gathering would be
endogenously derived from model parameters and the dates at which information is updated
might be distributed across individuals.
The probability of a change in the state from one period to the next is given by ; that is,
with probability 1  both sellers' costs are the same as in the previous period. Moreover,
if there is a cost change, we assume the new value of cit is uniformly distributed in [cL;cH].
By an appropriate change in units | and with no loss in generality | we normalize cL = 0
and cH = 1.
To summarize and recap: in each period, consumers are assigned to rms. Each con-
sumer observes its rm's price and decides whether to search for another rm's price (at a
cost s). After all search decisions have been made, each consumer buys a p from the rm
with the lowest observed price.
In what follows, we will be looking at Bayesian Equilibria (BE) of the above game.
3. Sticky prices
Let us rst consider pricing in period t = 1 (or, more generally, in an odd numbered period).
Since strategies and beliefs in t = 2 do not depend on t = 1 prices, the situation is analogous
to the Diamond (1971) pricing game. In equilibrium, if the search cost s is suciently large
with respect to the rms' cost dierence j cA1   cB1 j, both rms set their monopoly price,
which is given by pm(ci1) = (a + ci1)=2. To see that this is indeed a Nash equilibrium,
notice that, if each rm sets pm(ci1) and j cA1   cB1 j is small with respect to s, then the
dierence is prices is also small with respect to s, and consumers have no incentive to search.
Since consumers do not search, no rm has an incentive to set a dierent price. In fact, as
Diamond (1971) has shown, this is the unique equilibrium. Below we will also consider the
case when j cA1   cB1 j is large.
Our main result concerns pricing at t = 2 (more generally, pricing at even periods).
Before presenting our formal result, we rst provide an informal description of the main
intuition. We rst note that generally a simple repetition of the pricing equilibrium in
3. More generally, our results are also valid for the case when consumers observe seller' costs every k
periods, that is, at t = 1;k + 1;2k + 1, and so on, where k is a positive integer. Between periods
nk + 1 and (n + 1)k consumers only observe the price of the rm they are attached to.
3period 0 is unlikely to be an equilibrium. Specically, suppose that  is small and that rm
A experiences a small cost change. (Below we determine quantitative limits to the value of
, as a function of s, so that the result holds.) Should rm A set a price equal to monopoly
price as in the previous period? The answer is no. By changing its price, rm A signals to
consumers that its cost has likely changed. Conditionally on rm A's cost having changed,
rm B's cost has also changed (with probability one); in fact, it is uniformly distributed
between 0 and 1. This implies that there are signicant gains from consumer search. This
implies in turn that there is a good chance rm A will lose its customers. By contrast,
sticking to a constant price | not \rocking the boat" | assures rm A that there won't
be any search. In fact, since the probability of a cost change is small, consumers rightly
believe that, conditional on a sticky price, the likelihood of a cost change is small, and thus
the gains from search are lower than the search cost. Our main result (which is illustrated
by Figure 1) makes this statement more precise.
Proposition 1. Suppose that j pm(cA1)   pm(cB1) j < s. There exist s,  such that, if
0 < s < s and  < , then the following constitutes a Bayesian Equilibrium. The sellers'





pm(ci2) if ci2  c0
pm(c0) if c0 < ci2  c00(ci1)
pi1 if ci2 > c00(ci1)
The buyers strategy is as follows:
If p = pi1 or p  pm(c0), then do not search.
Otherwise, search.
where c0 < c00(ci1) < ci1, all for i = A;B.
Proof of Proposition 1: We show that the above strategies are indeed a Bayesian equilib-
rium.
We begin by showing that the consumers' strategy is optimal and their beliefs consistent.
If the consumer observes a price pi2 = pi1, then with probability 1    costs have not
changed; and, given the rm's strategy, the rival rm's price has not changed either. This
implies that if  is suciently small, then the gains from search are lower than the search
cost.
Suppose now that the consumer observes pi2 6= pi1. Given the rms' equilibrium strate-
gies, this implies the belief that costs have changed. In particular, the rival rm's cost, cj2,
is believed to be uniformly distributed in [0;1]. For pi2 < pm(c0), expected surplus in case












where c is the cost level such that pi2 = pm(c). To understand the above expression, note
rst that pi2 < pm(c0) and the equilibrium strategy together imply that if cj2 < c then
4pj2 = pm(cj2). We then have two possibilities: if rm j's cost is lower than c, then the
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the belief that rm j' cost is uniformly distributed between 0 and 1. If, on the other hand,





. This corresponds to the second term.






































The net benet from search function, R(c), plays an important role in the proof.
Lemma 1. (a) R(0) = 0; (b) R0(c) =
(a c)c
4 > 0.
Lemma 1 implies that there exists a positive value of c, say c0, such that, given the
above seller strategies, the net benet from search is positive if and only if pi2 > pm(c0)
(and pi2 6= pi1). Specically, c0 is given by R(c0) = s.
In the above analysis of the consumer strategy, we have assumed that  < . In
particular, if circ is small, then observing no change in price consumers assume that costs
have not changed. In the Appendix, we explicitly determine the upper bound . For
example, if a = 2, s = 1=200 and ci1 = cj1 = 1
2, then we get  <   :133. If s = 1=100,
then  <   :266; if s = 1=20, then  <   :979. So, while our general result assumes
that  is small, the above example suggests that we don't need  to be particularly close to
zero.
Consider now the rm's strategy. Notice that, along the equilibrium path, no search
takes place. This implies that, in considering what price to set, each rm is only concerned
about its customers' search behavior. In other words, at best a rm manages not to lose its
customers; it will never attract its rival's customers. If c < c0, the rm's strategy is clearly
optimal: consumers do not search even as the rm sets its monopoly price.
If c > c0, then there are two possibilities to take into account. Suppose that cA1 > cB1
and consider rm B's pricing problem. If pm(c0) < pB2 < pB1, then consumers search.
Given the rival rm's pricing strategy, the deviating rm keeps its customers if and only
if the rival's cost is greater than c00(cA1), which happens with probability 1   c00(cA1). Of
all the price levels between pm(c0) and pB1, the deviating rm prefers pm(c): it maximizes
prots given a set of buyers; and the set of buyers does not depend on price (within that








5Since the prot function is quasi-concave, the best alternative price levels are pm(c0) and
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which is equivalent to
c < c00(cB1) 
cB1 + c0
2
It follows that the rm's best alternative to pm(c) is pm(c0) if c < c00(cB1) and pB1 otherwise.









(a   pB1)(pB1   c):
It can be shown that, if cB1 < 1 < a (as we assume), then this conditions holds.
Consider next rm A's pricing problem. The main dierence with respect to rm B's
problem is that, by setting pA2 2 [pB1;pA1], rm A loses all of its customers regardless
of the value of cB2. However, as we saw above, the choice of intermediate values of pi2 is
dominated by the options pm(c0) or pi1. If this is true for rm B, this is true a fortiori for
rm A.
To conclude the analysis of the rm's strategy, notice that pricing above pi1 is clearly a
dominated strategy as the rm would lose all of its customers. (Notice that the maximum
value of cost is lower than pi1, so the seller can always make a positive prot.)
Figure 1 provides a graphical representation of the equilibrium strategies (for simplicity, we
assume cA1 = cB1). Notice that, if costs do not change, then prices do not change either.
Moreover, there is a wide range of values of ci2 (specically, ci2 2 [c00;1]) such that prices
remain unchanged even though costs change. In this sense, equilibrium pricing magnies
the stickiness of input costs: in period 2 (and more generally in an even period), prices
remain constant with greater probability than costs remain constant.
Suppose costs change from t = 1 to t = 2 but not from t = 2 to t = 3. Our assumptions
regarding consumer information imply that, at t = 3, a Diamond type equilibrium is played
again. Together with Proposition 1, this implies that prices do not change from t = 1
to t = 2 but they do change from t = 2 to t = 3 (that is, the move from one Diamond
equilibrium to another Diamond equilibrium). In this sense, the pattern implied by the
equilibrium above is one of delayed impact of cost changes on prices.
Moreover, considering a model extension whereby consumers are only informed about
costs every k periods, where k > 2, we could have several small cost changes in periods
2;3;:::;k, none of which would be reected in a price change. In this sense, the above
result suggests the possibility that output prices change with lower frequency than input
prices.
6Figure 1
Equilibrium price as a function of cost. For values of cost greater than c00(ci1), rm i sets the
same price as in the previous period: sticky prices.
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To summarize, the implication of the above equilibrium strategies is a pattern of sticky
prices, that is, prices that respond slowly to cost changes. The intuition for this pattern is
that a price change signals to consumers that costs have changed; and when costs change
the expected gains from search are greater. Not wishing to induce search, rms stick to
their previous price. For a given set of customers, a dierent price would lead to higher
prots, but factoring in the expected losses from lost customers a price change becomes
suboptimal. Formally, we show that the gains from adjusting price to a small cost change
are of second order (by the envelope theorem), whereas the expected loss due to consumer
searching and switching is of rst order.
Uniqueness. While we have shown that the above is a Bayesian Equilibrium (BE), we
should also note that it is not the unique BE. To see this, consider the situation when rm
i's initial cost is  higher than rm j's, where  is a small number. Suppose that, if costs
do not change, then seller i increases price by 2, whereas seller j keeps the same price as
before. Otherwise, the equilibrium price strategy is as before.
This pricing strategy is consistent with a BE. Out-of-equilibrium beliefs are as before:
any price pi2 6= pi1 + 2 and pi2 > pm(c0) leads consumers to search. Suppose there is no
cost change. If rm i sets any price other than pi1 +2, it will either make less money on a
per consumer basis or lose all consumers.4
By the above token, we can construct a continuum of BE. Our selection, that is, the
equilibrium implicit in Proposition 1, is based on a criterion that we think makes sense: if
costs do not change, then prices do not change either.5 However, we should reinforce the
4. Equilibria of this type can also be found when initial costs are identical. For example, suppose
equilibrium calls for both rms to decrease price by  even if costs have not changed. If a rm
does not change its price, then consumers will search, nd a rm with a slightly lower price (a rm
who followed equilibrium strategies) and switch. It follows that the designated strategy is indeed an
equilibrium strategy.
5. However, it is not the only criterion that makes sense. Specically, there are situations where equi-
librium calls for rms to play mixed strategies, so that prices change even if costs have not changed.
7idea that, while we are making this equilibrium selection assumption, we are not getting
price stickiness by assumption. In fact, the thrust of Proposition 1 is that equilibrium
strategies magnify the degree of stickiness in costs.
Large cost dierences. The above result assumes that, in period t = 1, rms' costs
are suciently close that each rm's equilibrium price is its monopoly price. We now
consider the case when they are not. Specically, suppose that cA1  cB1. Then, as
proved by Reinganum (1979), equilibrium prices (at t = 1) are given by pB1 = pm(cB1)









Thus, if cA1   cB1 is suciently large, then pA1 < pm(cA1).
Now consider what happens at t = 2. Suppose rst that there is no cost change. Then
neither rm A nor rm B have an incentive to change their price (for the same reasons as
before). This is clear for rm B, who is pricing at monopoly level. It is also true for rm A
because any price change would lead consumers to search, which in turn would lead rm A
to lose all of its customers (unless it prices below rm B, in which case it keeps the same
number of customers but makes less prot per customer).
Consider now the case when there is a small cost change. If rm B's cost decreases by
a small amount or increases by any amount, then, by the same argument as in Proposition
1, rm B is better o by keeping its price xed. In fact, adjusting price to its new optimal
level would lead to a second-order increase in prot per customer. However, conditionally
on costs having changed, there is a positive probability that the rival's cost decreases by a
large amount; and since a price change leads to search, there is a positive probability that
rm B is left with no consumers.
Consider now rm A's case. Suppose its cost changes by a small amount. Now it's no
longer the case that keeping price xed is necessarily optimal, because rm A's gain from
adjusting price might be of rst-order magnitude. Therefore, it is conceivable that for some
parameter values rm A is better o by adjusting its price in the direction of its monopoly
price level.
In sum, when cost dierences are large we can only guarantee price stickiness by the lower
cost rm. Overall, our results imply that price stickiness occurs with positive probability.
4. Asymmetric price adjustment
Several studies (Peltzman, 2000, and references therein) indicate that prices decrease more
slowly when costs go down than they increase when costs go up. In this section we show
that our model can accommodate this pattern in a natural way. Until now we assumed that,
conditional on a cost change, rm i's cost is independent of rm j's. One would expect
some positive correlation between rm costs when they change. We now consider a revised
version of our model where costs are correlated.
As before, costs change with a (small) probability . We now assume that, if costs
change, then either both costs increase or both costs decrease. Specically, costs are inde-
pendently and uniformly distributed in [0;ci1] (if costs decrease) or [ci1;1] (if costs increase).
For simplicity, we also assume that ci1 = cj1.
The derivation of a BE is similar to Section 3. The crucial dierence is that rms
increase prices when their cost increases. The reason is that a price increase by rm i
signals a cost increase by rm i. And, to the extent that costs are correlated, it also signals
8Figure 2
Equilibrium price as a function of cost in numerical example. Costs are uniformly distributed;
demand is linear: q = 2   p; initial cost is ci1 = :5 for both rms. The equilibrium cost
thresholds are given by c0 = :102; c00 = :301; c000 = :619.
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pi1 = pm(ci1) = 1:25
1.5
0 c0 c00 ci1 c000 1
an increase in rm j's price. It follows that consumers may prefer not to search despite a
cost increase, provided it's small enough.
Proposition 2. Suppose that j pm(cA1)   pm(cB1) j< s. There exist s,  such that, if
0 < s < s and  < , then the following constitutes a Bayesian Equilibrium. The sellers'
pricing policy is as follows:
pi2 =
8
> > > > > > > > <
> > > > > > > > :
pm(ci2) if ci2  c0
pm(c0) if c0 < ci2  c00(ci1)
pi1 if c00(ci1) < ci2  ci1
pm(ci2) if ci1 < ci2  c000
pm(c000) if ci2 > c000
The buyers' strategy is as follows:
if pi2  pm(c0) then do not search
if pm(c0) < pi2 < pi1 then search
if pi1  pi2  pm(c000) then do not search
if pi2 > pm(c000) then search
These equilibrium strategies are illustrated in Figure 2. Similarly to Section 3, they imply
a pattern of price stickiness whereby (a) prices vary less frequently than costs, and (b)
prices respond slowly to cost changes. Moreover, we now notice a clear asymmetry in the
way prices respond to small cost changes: prices remain unchanged following small cost
decreases but increase following small cost increases. Finally, we never observe large price
increases, whereas we do observe large price decreases.
9Figure 3
Cost changes and price changes.
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Empirical implications. Proposition 2 shows that when the direction of cost change is
suciently correlated across rms, then, for small cost changes, prices respond more rapidly
to cost increases than to cost decreases. We now derive a series of empirical implications of
this theoretical result.
Speed of price response to cost changes. As Figure 3 illustrates, our equilibrium
seems consistent with the idea that, for small cost changes, prices respond more rapidly
to cost increases than to cost increases. Specically, the gure considers a situation where
costs increase by a bit from t = 1 to t = 2 and then decrease by a bit from t = 3 to t = 4.
As can be seen, a cost increase is immediately reected in a price increase; whereas a cost
decrease results in a price decrease with a lag. Peltzman (2000) presents evidence that is
consistent with the pattern illustrated by Figure 3.
Correlation between cost changes and price changes. A related empirical implication
is that there is a greater correlation between cost changes and price changes on the way up
than on the way down. Buckle and Carlson (1998) survey New Zealand businesses and ask
them in separate questions whether prices were raised or lowered in a particular quarter;
and whether costs increased or decreased. They nd that price and cost increases paired
more frequently in the same quarter than price and cost decreases.
Frequency and size of price changes. Our model also suggests that price decreases are
less frequent than price increases; and that the absolute value of price increases is smaller
than the absolute value of price decreases. The empirical evidence seems consistent with
this prediction. See Klenow and Kryvstov (2008) for the U.S. and Dhyne et al (2004) for
the Euro area.
Asymmetry in the small. In our revised model, the asymmetry in frequency of price
changes results from the fact that small cost decreases lead to no change in price. More
generally, we expect that the asymmetry in rates of price adjustment is particularly high
for small cost changes. Levy et al (2005) present evidence that seems consistent with
10this prediction. Analyzing scanner data that cover 29 product categories over a eight-year
period from a large Mid-western supermarket chain, they show that small price increases
occur more frequently than small price decreases; no such asymmetry is found for larger
price changes.
5. Conclusion
Much of the current literature on price rigidity is based on the idea of menu costs. However,
in order to t the stylized facts on price rigidity the required size of menus costs is rather
high. In this paper, we present a consumer search theory of price rigidity that does not
require menu costs. To some extent, one may reinterpret the idea of menu costs to include
a decrease in seller prot resulting from price change. In this broad sense, our model does
feature menu costs. However, such loose interpretation of menu costs is of little help: the
size of such menu cost is not xed as in the traditional physical menu cost case; in particular,
it will be dierent depending on whether price increases or decreases.
11Appendix
Derivation of upper bound on . Conditional on observing no price change, the
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Assuming a = 2;s = 1=200 and ci1 = cj1 = 1
2, we get  <   :133. If s = 1=100, then
 <   :266; if s = 1=20, then  <   :979.
Proof of Proposition 2: We now show that the above strategies constitute a Bayesian
equilibrium. For low values of c, the seller's strategy is similar to Section 3. As before, we
have threshold levels c0 and c00. One dierence is that, by observing a price lower than pi1,
consumers believe costs to be distributed in [0;ci1]. This implies greater expected benets
from searching. As a result, we obtain lower values of c0; c00 than in Section 3.
Now suppose that pi2 is greater than, but close to, pi1. Given the sellers' pricing strategy,















where c is the cost level such that p = pm(c). In words, if seller j's cost is x < c, then the




. If, on the other hand, x > c, then the buyer sticks with
rm i's pm(c).




. Given our assumption of linear
demand, we get a net expected benet from searching equal to
R(c) =
(a   ci1)3   (a   c)3
24ci1
+
(a   c)2 (ci1   c)
8(1   ci1)
:
12The derivative of this expression with respect to c is given by
(a c)(c ci1)
4(1 ci1) , which is positive.
Moreover, R(ci1) = 0. It follows that there exists a value of c greater than ci1 such that the
net benet from search is equal to the search cost. Let c000 be such value, that is, R(c000) = s.
It follows that, for pi1 < pi2  pm(c000), consumers are better o by not searching.
By the same token, if pi2 > pm(c000), then consumers prefer to search. The fact pi2 > pi1
signals that costs are uniformly distributed in [ci1;1], as in the previous case; and since
R(c) > s, it pays to search.
This concludes the proof that the buyers' strategy is a best response to the seller's strat-
egy; and that the buyers' beliefs are consistent with the sellers' strategy. Regarding the
seller's strategy, the argument is essentially identical to Section 3.
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